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Following Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004, an estimated two to three million Polish citizens have left for other EU states. Britain, Ireland and Sweden opened their employment markets to them immediately in 2004; other states of the old Fifteen took advantage of various derogation periods to postpone the opening of their labor markets to the citizens of Poland and of some other new member states. As a result, the vast majority of Polish (im)migrants arrived in the United Kingdom and Ireland. In the Republic of Ireland, at 200, 000 they constitute around five per cent of the population, rising to ten per cent in Dublin and its vicinity. I argue that one cannot construe them in a traditional manner as an immigrant group, who will lose their native language in the next generation, and thus become a linguistically and culturally indistinguishable part of Ireland’s English-speaking population. Firstly, their move is within the EU’s common political-cum-administrative space, which is similar to moving within the boundaries of a single state. Secondly, cheap flights, the internet, and satellite television and radio allow them to remain part of the mainstream Polish-language community, mostly concentrated in Poland. In light of this, I predict that part of Ireland’s population will remain permanently Polish-speaking (though largely bi- and multilingual), making it likely that Polish will become another one of Ireland’s languages, taking its place beside English, Irish and Ulster Scots. (It is also possible that Lithuanian, Russian and Slovak will achieve the same status.)


Languages and Different Polands: Looking Backward

Today’s Poland as an ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-state of ethnic Poles (that is, Polish-speaking monolinguals) came into being in the 1940s. In interwar Poland at least one third of the polity’s citizenry was composed of people of ethnicities other than Polish. (Jankowiak-Konik 2011: 120) From the linguistic vantage, the biggest groups of these other ethnicities spoke Ukrainian, Yiddish, Belarusian, and German in everyday life. There were also numerically smaller ethnic groups speaking other languages. However, members of many of the minorities had a command of other languages in addition to their own ethnic ones. The lands that composed interwar Poland had previously belonged to the Russian Empire, the German Empire or Austria-Hungary. This meant that many of the speakers of the aforementioned languages also had a working command of Russian, German, or Polish (in the latter case due to the official status of Polish in Vienna’s Crownland of Galicia after 1869). By the same token, many among the two-thirds of the population of interwar Poland who were Polish-speaking also shared with their fellow citizens this bilingual facility, in these cases generally speaking either Russian or German, as well as Polish. Under the influence of Warsaw’s Polonizing policies, there was a lessening of the pressure on Polish-speakers to continue to acquire languages other than the standard Polish then taught in school. Conversely, Poland’s non-Polish-speakers were increasingly forced to acquire Polish, in part through being gradually deprived by the state administration of educational opportunities in their own languages. (Horak 1961)

This trend was disrupted by World War II. At different periods during the war and in various sections of interwar Poland (as it was partitioned and occupied by Germany and the Soviet Union) either German or Russian became the dominant language in different regions of the country. In one of the sectors of Poland occupied by Germany (that renamed the Generalgouvernement by the conquering power), Ukrainian-speakers tended to be favored vis-à-vis their Polish counterparts. Similarly, in the Soviet zone of occupied Poland, where Polish territory was allocated to the Soviet republics of Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine, the respective languages of Lithuanian, Byelorussian (Belorusian)​[2]​ and Ukrainian were privileged over Polish in public life. (cf Prel 1942) The official language frontiers shifted over and back across the territory of Poland, as the fortunes of Germany and the Soviet Union fluctuated between 1941 and 1945.

Subsequently, the Holocaust of the Jews, the mass expulsions, and the resettlements created zones of tentative ethnolinguistic homogeneity, often privileging one language (construed as a ‘national language’) over another (relegated to, at most, the role of a ‘minority language.’ (Jankowiak-Konik 2011: 148-153, 164-171; Magocsi 2002: 189-193; Sienkiewicz and Hryciuk 2008) The inability to speak the ‘correct’ language became a serious social and political liability, and was often punishable by law: for the sake of survival, people did their utmost to stick to a language deemed to be ‘correct.’ 

The fluid situation solidified after 1945. The new Poland’s frontiers were radically shifted westward, concomitantly with the expulsion under Allied auspices of the German populations from the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line now ceded to Poland (with the exception of the northern half of East Prussia, which was incorporated into the Soviet Union, or more exactly into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). On the other hand, the eastern half of interwar Poland was left within the Soviet Union. Populations speaking ‘incorrect languages’ were exchanged between these former Polish territories now under Soviet rule and the new and more westerly postwar Poland that had reemerged.​[3]​ Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians who remained in the new Poland were encouraged to leave for the Soviet Union, while Poles from Moscow’s slice of interwar Poland were, variously, coerced or merely permitted to leave for the new Poland between 1944 and 1959. (Kącka and Stępka 1994; Kosiński 1963; Orłowski and Sakson 1997)

In postwar Poland educational and cultural provisions for non-Polish speaking minorities were erratic, vacillating between the denial of their existence, the grudging acceptance of them as a tiny fraction of the entire population, and the pressure to leave the country (through either official compulsion or the organically arising stimulus to go due to the worsening political and economic circumstances). As a result, by the late 1960s, practically no contiguous areas inhabited by non-Polish-speakers were left in communist Poland, the only exceptions being a cluster of Lithuanian-speaking villages in the vicinity of Puńsk and the area around Białystok inhabited by the Orthodox population speaking dialects of varying similarity to Byelorussian and Polish. (Adamczuk and Łodziński 2006)

After 1945 not only did Poland become synonymous with the territory homogenously inhabited by Polish-speakers only, but Poland became the only polity in which the Polish language was an official and national language. Until 1938 Polish had been an official language of Soviet Byelorussia, alongside Byelorussian, Russian and Yiddish. Furthermore, between the two World Wars a Polish autonomous district had existed in Soviet Ukraine, and another in Soviet Byelorussia. (Ioffe 2003: 1014)

However, after World War II, despite population exchanges between the Soviet Union and Poland, considerable Polish-speaking areas remained in the region of Vilnius in Soviet Lithuania and in that of Hrodna / Grodno in Soviet Byelorussia. In reality the two formed a single geographical area that happened to be divided by the republican border between Lithuania and Byelorussia within the Soviet Union, a border that persisted as the state frontier between Lithuania and Belarus after the USSR’s collapse. Polish-speakers in Ukraine, though demographically almost as numerous as those in Belarus, are not concentrated in compact areas of settlement. A much smaller Polish-speaking area adjacent to Poland’s southern border remains in the northeastern corner of the Czech Republic, centered on the town of Český Těšín. (Gąsowski 2000; Morita 2006; Wapiński 2004)

The Polish-speaking areas and minorities outside Poland, to the east and south, continue to be multilingual, unlike the bulk of Polish-speakers within the country. In this they are more akin to the multiethnic population of interwar Poland than to the largely monoglot Poles of contemporary Poland. Furthermore, the exigencies of nationally construed modernity require citizens to be highly literate in the language of the state. The provision of education in other languages, now dubbed ‘minority,’ is considered – though more tacitly so than openly – to be troublesome, a scarcely affordable luxury, or even harmful. Hence, the command of their ethnic / national / community language among Polish-speakers in Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine or the Czech Republic is shaky or antiquated, while most are more fluent in the state language (or in Russian in the case of the post-Soviet states​[4]​). (Dzwonkowski 1994; Skarbek 1993)

Economic, political and wartime emigration of Polish-speakers from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries spawned a considerable number of compact Polish-speaking communities, mainly in Western Europe and North America. Distance and, later, half a century of isolation imposed first by World War II and then by the Iron Curtain cut these communities off from Poland. They predominantly assimilated to the languages of their states of residence in the second, or at the latest, in the third generation. It is worthwhile mentioning, however, that the two largest communities of this kind survive to this day in Chicago’s Jackowo (that is, Avondale) and in New York’s Green Point neighborhoods, which were successively replenished by waves of new arrivals from communist Poland after the political upheavals of 1956, 1968-1970 and 1980-1981, and the fall of communism in 1989.​[5]​ (Walaszek and Bartkowiak 2001)

The third Polish-language community, rarely adverted to or acknowledged in Poland, unlike the aforementioned two in Chicago and New York, is that of those Polish-speaking Jews who settled in Israel, following the Holocaust and the expulsion of the remaining Jews from communist Poland after 1968. (Brendt 2009) Until the turn of the 1990s, they constituted the largest market outside Poland for Polish-language books. In the case of the other Polish-speaking communities located outside Poland, their language was considered to be the primary badge of their ethnic / national identity, equally by these expatriate Polish-speakers themselves and by their co-nationals in Poland itself. This was not so in the case of Israel’s Polish-speakers, even if they chose to identify themselves as Poles. Irrespective of their language and declared identity during World War II, Germany’s Holocaust machine singled them out as Jews rather than Poles. Even after the war, persisting anti-Semitism sought to deny them the right to claim any Polishness. Ironically, on the average, the command of standard Polish seems to have been the best among Israel’s Polish-speakers in comparison to other Polish-speaking communities outside communist Poland.​[6]​ (Jagodzińska 2008; Księgarnia 2011; Landau-Czajka 2008; Spolsky and Shohamy 1999: 196-197)

Another identificationally anomalous community that can be referred to as Polish-speaking is that in (West) Germany. Apart from ethnic Poles who remained in Germany after 1945 and those who subsequently gained political asylum there during communist times, most of the Polish speakers in Germany are so-called Aussiedlers (‘re-settlers’) in German. This term means pre-1945 German citizens who were retained (more often than not against their will) in postwar Poland, and their descendants. In the vast majority of cases, in communist Poland they were dubbed ‘autochthons,’ or ‘ethnic Poles inadequately aware of their primordial Polishness.’ Until 1945 they most usually spoke Slavic dialects (today considered to be the Slavic languages of Kashubian, Mazurian and Silesian in their own right) and German, which they acquired at school; since 1945, they have spoken these dialects and Polish, similarly acquired at school. In (West) Germany the vast majority of them shifted to German in the second generation and had only a scant command of the Slavic dialects or Polish. Regardless of the self-identification of the people themselves, Bonn deemed all the autochthons to be Germans, while Warsaw considered the Aussiedlers from Poland (or autochthons who had left for West Germany) to be Poles. (cf Blanke 2001; Pallaske 2002)

In the case of Polish-speakers in Israel and (West) Germany, the Polish language has failed to function as an unambiguous sign of their ethnic / national identity. This was due to the vagaries of official policies, the decisions of the speakers themselves, and the popular sentiment that prevailed in states interested in these speech communities.


After 2004: A Newly New Poland 

The Soviet bloc fell apart in 1989, and two years later this was followed by the breakup of the Soviet Union itself. These events occurred in the period when the newly regained democratic freedoms were coupled with unprecedented developments in communications technologies that facilitated affordable instantaneous mass communication across entire continents. The video cassette and satellite television had already become widely available in postcommunist Europe at the turn of the 1990s. The revolution in international communications intensified when the internet joined them in earnest during the following decade.

The tyranny of distance that had previously kept emigrant language communities isolated from the main body of the speakers of a language can now be bridged quite effortlessly. Hence, these communities are not slated for gradual fading and extinction, but can, if they so choose, continue to participate in the mainstream of their own culture in their own languages. Even the isolation effected by a restrictive visa regime or by rigorous border checks with a neighboring country, as in the case between Poland and Belarus, can be also overcome in the same way.

The successful political and economic transformation of the Soviet bloc countries, combined with the political will and the forward-looking vision of the Old Fifteen of the European Union made possible the ‘big bang’ eastward enlargement of this Union in 2004, followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as an afterthought three years later.

Poland with its population of 38 million accounted for more than half of the inhabitants in the eight postcommunist (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), post-Soviet (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and post-Yugoslav (Slovenia) polities that joined the EU in 2004. Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom were the only three states from the Old Fifteen that immediately opened their employment markets to the new members. Other Old Fifteen member states decided to impose various derogation periods on the free movement of labor from the new EU states. Austria and Germany, states that border directly on the new members, availed of the full seven-year delay that was legally permissible, before finally opening their employment markets to citizens from the new member countries in 2011.

Serendipitously, the large cohort of eighteen- to thirty-year-olds, with secondary, post-secondary and university education, who could not find gainful employment in Poland were warmly welcomed by employers in Ireland and Britain, which were then starved of labor. The honeymoon lasted until the onset of the global financial crisis and economic downturn in 2008. But the pundits who predicted that the Poles who had moved to other EU states would now return to Poland were proved wrong. How can one explain this phenomenon, which has confounded the experts? 

Consider, for instance, that the unemployment rate in Ireland soared from 4 per cent in 2004 to 13 per cent in 2010, and from the same threshold to 8 per cent in Britain, while in Poland it dropped from 20 per cent to 13 per cent during the same time. (Bezrobocie w Polsce 2010; Economy Tracker 2011; Unemployment rate 2010; UK Unemployment 2011) So what appears to be an economic miracle in Poland looks like a tragedy in Ireland or like hard times in the United Kingdom. What counts is the initial point of reference. Moving from the level of national statistics to the level of the individual, one should remember that the point of reference and comparison for Poles who moved away from Poland after 2004 is their own places of residence prior to departure. The majority of them stem from villages and towns, where unemployment was substantially higher and continues to this day to be higher than the national average. (Radiukiewicz 2006: 7) On the other hand, though unemployment has tended to be substantially lower than the national average in big cities (for example, just 3 per cent in 2010 in Warsaw or Poznań [Bezrobocie w Warszawie 2011]), employers do not offer a living wage in Poland. Hence, while a person from a town or village can easily find a job in a city, the job would not pay enough to allow the person to rent appropriate accommodation or to pay for commuting expenses from home. (Brzostek 2006)

The paradoxical and counterintuitive result is that it is still easier and economically more viable for unemployed young people from the Polish countryside and towns to obtain jobs in Dublin or London than in Warsaw or Cracow. When one realizes the factual position, it does not come as a surprise that the Poles who moved to the Old Fifteen after 2004 do not stream back to Poland now. Indeed, in 2010 as many as 500 Polish citizens continued to move to Ireland each month. (Personal Public Service Numbers 2010) What appears to one person to be a case of economic near-collapse, as Ireland tends to be portrayed in the mass media nowadays, is a land of opportunity to another. The standard of living of well over 80 per cent of Poles who settled in Ireland improved markedly in comparison to what they had or could count on back in Poland. (Radiukiewicz 2006: 47)


The Polish-speaking Community in Ireland​[7]​

Between 2004 and 2008, 2.5 million to 3 million persons left Poland for the old EU member states and the other European Economic Area countries (especially, Iceland and Norway). (Ilu Polaków 2010) At present it is estimated that 200, 000 Polish citizens settled down in the Republic of Ireland and 50,000 in the United Kingdom’s Northern Ireland. (1,3 tys. Polaków 2009; Newenham 2010; Personal Public Service Numbers 2009) Half of them graduated from universities and the rest from secondary and post-secondary schools. (Radiukiewicz 2006: 7)

They account for almost 4.5 per cent of Ireland’s population, and for 2.8 per cent of the inhabitants in Northern Ireland. Because in Ireland the plurality of Polish citizens live in Dublin and its vicinity, they may amount to as many as a tenth of the population in the Irish capital and its metropolitan area. Hence, though many more Poles moved to Britain after 2004 (that is, around one million [Smithers 2007]) than to Ireland, they constitute a considerably bigger proportion of the population in the latter country. In these terms the situation is comparable only to that in Iceland, where 20,000 Polish citizens add up to 6.3 per cent of that island nation’s inhabitants. (Iceland Faces 2008)

Roughly speaking, half of all the immigrants who arrived in Ireland after 2004 have been Polish citizens. (Radiukiewicz 2006: 13) These new arrivals together are responsible for the recent significant increase in the number of live births registered in the country, from 61, 000 per annum in 2005 to 75, 000 in 2008. (O’Regan 2009, O’Regan 2010; Population and Migration 2009: 2) On this basis, it can be safely assumed that 14, 000 babies were born to immigrant parents in 2008, including 7, 000 to Poles. Obviously, it is a simplification, as the phenomena of marrying outside one’s ethnic group or of establishing informal households with partners who are not Poles are far from uncommon. And as of 2008 and 2009 the first cohorts of the children began entering Irish elementary schools.

Unfortunately, their arrival in the schools coincided with the current economic downturn. Still dazed by the unexpected speed with which Ireland became a multicultural and multiethnic country during the past decade, Dublin does not have a plan, let alone a policy, for how to manage this newly gained multiculturalism. The unwilling victims of this dithering and of the economic situation are the children of immigrant parents. A stop-gap measure that smoothed their integration into the educational mainstream was the appointment of teaching assistants; the main issue to be tackled was the children’s inadequate command of English. However, the Irish government, introducing new rounds of austerity measures, now progressively limits the number of teaching assistants, thus lessening the chances of immigrant children to catch up with their Irish peers. (Edwards 2011) The danger is that this negligence may cost Ireland dear in the future; for instance, it may lead to the emergence of violent ethnic ghettoes, the management of which will be much costlier than any transient savings achieved by paring down the education budget.


Ireland’s Poles and Tongues

The Polish-language community in Ireland is quite novel on several counts if compared with other Polish-speech communities that exist outside today’s Poland. Firstly, let us have a look at the Polish language of Ireland’s Poles. They were born and educated in this unusual Poland that was made homogenously monolingual during the communist period. On the one hand, it meant the suppression of the use of languages other than Polish in the country, while, on the other, it saw a dramatic reduction in the use of extant dialects of Polish itself. The former was achieved through expulsions, dispersal and/or forced assimilation (Polonization) of those groups that were considered non-Polish-speaking; these means included the informal but fully enforced ban on the use of their languages in public and private. The disappearance of dialects came about more gradually, due to voluntary and involuntary mass population movements, the institution of the compulsory popular educational system that stigmatized non-standard varieties of Polish, and especially the profound influence of radio and television which had become ubiquitous in Poland by the mid-1970s. Hence, Ireland’s Poles almost invariably speak uniformly standard Polish.

In contrast, however, the Polish language of the pre-2004 Polish immigrant communities in the United States and Western Europe tends to be (sometimes highly) dialectal. This is because their core groups arrived there before World War II, from the multilingual Poland of those times, when only a narrow elite had a command of standard Polish. Later, these immigrant communities were replenished by new waves of economic and political emigrants from Poland in the wake of the socio-political upheavals of 1945-47, 1956 and 1968-70. The majority of them stemmed from among peasants and workers, who then still did not speak standard Polish as a matter of course. The first substantial wave of speakers of standard Polish, already adult and educated during the communist period, went abroad following the brief Solidarity period of 1980-81, before emigration was swiftly clamped down on with the imposition of martial law.

Likewise, the Polish minorities in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (minorities that are close in their demographic sizes to Ireland’s Polish-language community) are highly dialectal. In Belarus their Polish is often the same as the Belarusian of their Belarusian neighbors, the actual difference being rather ethnoreligious than ethnolinguistic, though for ideological reasons the difference is couched in terms of language difference. In a Belarusian village with Polish minority inhabitants, both Poles and Belarusians tend to speak the local Slavic dialect and prefer to switch to Russian for official business. But the local dialect when committed to paper in the Latin letters of the Roman Catholic faith becomes the Polish language; the same dialect, when reduced to writing in the Cyrillic letters associated with Orthodox Christianity or Uniatism (Greek Catholicism), becomes the Belarusian language.

In this set of parallels, the Polish-language community in Ireland exhibits some of the characteristics of those in the United States, which are concentrated in the cities of New York and Chicago. The crucial difference, however, is that while the Polish communities hardly make a mark on the overall complexion of these vast American metropolises, Polish-speakers in Dublin are clearly visible (and audible), because they account for 10 per cent of the inhabitants. A monolingual Polish-speaker might live his or her life without using a word of English in certain specific, singularly ‘Polish’ quarters of Chicago or New York, but not elsewhere in those cities. However, in Greater Dublin a monolingual Polish-speaker can manage to find work, do shopping and find appropriate entertainment all over the city, all these channeled through the medium of his native language. The attitudes and preferences of Dublin’s Polish community mean that such a Polish-speaker in Dublin typically prefers not to enclose herself in the (quite deceptive) security of an ethnolinguistic ghetto, in contrast to many of her counterparts in Chicago or New York.

The spread of the rest of the Polish-speech community across Ireland, with smaller, though still visible, concentrations in Belfast and other cities, is like that of the Polish minority in western Ukraine. The almost unprecedented monolingualism of Ireland’s Poles in standard Polish is similar only to that of the Polish-speaking community of Jews in Israel. Interwar Poland’s Jews were better educated than other inhabitants of the country, which explains their facility in standard Polish. Then, the group was replenished with the crème de la crème of communist Poland’s intellectual elite, following the expulsion of the Jews from the country in 1968-70. The high level of education achieved by Ireland’s Poles also makes them in this respect more similar to Israel’s Polish-speech community than to any other pre-2004 Polish-language communities outside Poland. 

The difference between the Polish-speech communities in Ireland and Israel lies, firstly, in the initial near-monolingualism of the former, whereas numerous members of the latter had a certain command of the Jewish languages of Yiddish and Hebrew; members of the latter community also spoke other languages, mainly German and Russian, languages that had proved useful in the interwar years and during World War II. Today the Polish-language community in Israel is dominated by middle-aged and elderly people who have become fluent in Hebrew. In view of the fact that Polish is of no political, cultural or identificational importance in contemporary Israel, and because the country’s Polish-language community most probably will never be replenished with more Polish-speaking settlers from Poland, its Polish speakers are bound to vanish soon as a distinctive group. 

In the Republic of Ireland two languages are official, Irish and English, but the former is also designated as the national language. However, for all practical purposes, the entire public life in the country is channeled through the medium of English (constitutionally, a second official language), with the partial exception of the Gaeltacht (that is, officially designated Irish-speaking) areas. These areas have a combined population of 92, 000, of whom only 70 per cent are Irish-speakers. Indeed, in the entire country, no more than 19, 000 people speak Irish on a daily basis. (Census 2006 2007: 81-82)

In Northern Ireland three languages are official, namely, English, Irish and Ulster Scots. Here the situation is similar to that in the Republic: English dominates in every sphere of public life. No more than 30, 000 persons speak Ulster Scots in everyday life and Irish is used frequently by, at most, 20, 000 people. (Do You Yourself 1999; Now a Few Questions 1999)

As a result, without wanting to appear to gloat over the surprising situation that has materialized since 2004, the position is that in purely numerical terms Polish is now the second largest language of everyday communication, both in the Republic and in Northern Ireland. This may have all kinds of practical and even political ramifications. One would hope that the latter will be of a limited extent. The Poles who settled in Ireland never expected to use their native language at work or in state offices, so it is doubtful that they will demand political recognition of their language in any foreseeable future. However, the potential for a change of heart in this matter will remain because, as I argue below when commenting on the maintenance of the language, Polish is bound to remain a permanent fixture of Irish society and culture for generations to come.

On the other hand, language is not the paramount locus of (national) identity in the British Isles, as it is in Central and Eastern Europe. The recognition of both Ulster Scots and Irish in Northern Ireland is of a tokenistic character, and the national status of Irish in the Republic is honored more in the breach than in the observance. As the long-lasting conflict in Northern Ireland has shown time and again, the lines of division are drawn more on the basis of religion, or perhaps more truly, with the vague memory of whether one’s parents or grandparents went to a Catholic or a Protestant church on Sunday. In this the situation is similar to that in post-Yugoslav Bosnia, where Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs speak the same Slavic dialect and are able to distinguish one from another only by ascribing Islam, Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity, respectively, to these national groups as their badges of difference. (It was only in the mid-1990s that these ethnoreligious differences began to be translated into the terms of language, leading to strenuous efforts to sunder the common dialect of all three groups into the separate languages of Bosniak [Bosnian],​[8]​ Croatian and Serbian. [Greenberg 2004])

A parallel with this is evident in the areas of the Belarusian countryside where there is a Polish minority; people speaking the same Slavic dialect see themselves as either Belarusians or Poles, on the basis of confession and script. Having said that, the homogenous Catholicism of Ireland’s Poles makes them fall foul of certain Protestant groups in Northern Ireland, who often perceive the Polish-speakers to be strengthening the religion-based dominance of the local Irish nationalists in this province.​[9]​ And vice versa, Irish radical (militant) groups have treated Poles as ‘collaborators’ when they render commercial services to British soldiers. (cf Atak bombowy 2011; Paluch 2009)

Following the fall of communism in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union two years later, ‘Slavia’​[10]​ seems to have spawned two permanent Slavic-speaking communities outside the traditional confines of the Slavic-speaking world, namely the Russian-language community in Israel, and the Polish-language one in Ireland. The new Israeli Russophone community is similar in its identificational character to Israel’s waning Polish-speaking community. Israel’s Polish-speakers, like the recently arrived Russian-speakers, primarily identify themselves as Jews, either through religion or in cultural terms through their generational-cum-cultural memory of Judaism as practiced by their ancestors. However, on the basis of their native language, Ireland’s Polish-speakers identify themselves and are identified by the Irish as Poles.

Both communities, Russian-speakers in Israel and Ireland’s Polish-speakers, due to their demographic share in the populations of the two states, seem likely to continue to speak their own languages for generations to come. Israel’s Russian-speakers have made a dent in the state’s compulsory policy of Hebraization, leading to the rise of a parallel cultural and intellectual world channeled through Russian. Many of them consider Hebrew to be just a local language of only slight importance outside Israel, while Russian facilitates their access to the economies and cultures of numerous post-Soviet states. In this function Russian is similar to English, the knowledge of which is also widespread in Israel among all the country’s inhabitants. 

It is also the English language that has attracted Poles to Britain and Ireland. With 4.5 million inhabitants, the population of Ireland is only half that of Sweden (which  has 9.5 million inhabitants). However, no more than 15, 000 Polish citizens moved to Sweden between 2004 and 2009, even though this country, like Britain and Ireland, had opened its employment market to them immediately after Poland had joined the EU. (Sawicki 2009: 231) The most compelling explanation of this phenomenon is the operation of the language factor. When one acquires Swedish one can work and live in Sweden and in some areas of Finland; the acquisition of English offers a considerably wider range of options in this respect. When making the difficult decision to leave one’s own country, the educated migrant makes a rational calculation of how to limit the personal risks and to maximize the potential gains. English won hands down over languages like Swedish as the most favored foreign language learned by Poles, and so, since 2004 Polish-speakers have streamed to Britain and Ireland.

The vast majority of Poles arriving in both countries had, at best, a limited knowledge of English, but were determined quickly to acquire as much of this language as necessary for work and life. Their progress has been fast, especially in respect of those younger than 35, who constitute the vast majority of the Polish-speakers living in the two states. (In Britain they may be only a plurality:  many Polonophone refugees and soldiers settled in this country after the Second World War, raising the mean age of Polish speakers in Britain today higher than it is in Ireland. It is difficult to be precise on this question.) They gained a facility in English on the job, through self-study  and, more rarely (because of a shortage of money), by attending formal courses. The organic manner in which they have acquired English is frequently evident in their speech; in Ireland many became fluent in Hibernian English, while across the Irish Sea they speak Britain’s local and regional dialects, rather than the standard of this language grounded in the dialect of the London elite and of southeast England. Perhaps this makes their integration with local communities swifter, while not limiting the possibility of their leaving for another Anglophone country, should the need arise.

Hence, Poles who arrived from monolingual Poland and who live now in Britain and Ireland are already bilingual, or more correctly ‘diglossic.’ They tend to use Polish and English in different spheres of their lives. For instance, because the majority of them do blue collar work, despite their high educational attainment, they excel in spoken English, while doing little writing in this language. For the time being, Polish remains their preferred language of written communication, and it is easier for them to consume literature in this language, rather than in English. But this is a fluid and potentially changing state of affairs, and the final shape of the diglossia has not yet stabilized. 

The unknown factor in this situation concerns the children of recent migrants. In the Republic of Ireland there is a requirement that classes in the Irish language must be attended by all students who enter the educational system when younger than 11. (Exemption 2011) As a result, children born in Ireland to Polish-speaking parents most probably will become polyglossic, at least, in English, Irish and Polish. Then if one adds Hibernian English and standard English to this equation as separate entities, alongside the rarer cases of fluency in Ulster Scots, it may mean the ability to switch among four or even five language codes, without taking into account foreign languages (that is, other languages typically not employed as languages of the speech communities in Ireland or Poland) that are learned at school.


Remaining a Polish-speaker in Ireland

I claim above that due to its considerable size in comparison with the population of Ireland and thanks to various recent technological and service developments, the Polish-speaking community in Ireland is bound to retain its language. Until recently, the usual pattern among emigrant communities far removed from their home countries or ethnic homelands was language loss that left the grandchildren of the original emigrants with no knowledge of their ethnic language, but for a handful of words.

These technological and service developments, which were not widely available even a decade ago, to a considerable extent annihilate the geographical distance. This allows Ireland’s Polish-speaking community to participate, almost seamlessly and in real time, in the mainstream of Polish-language life that is continually being created and played out in Poland.

In the early days of the migration, ballooning fleets of buses brought Poles to the British Isles and created a virtual bridge between these westerly isles and Poland. As early as 2005-6 low cost air carriers had taken over this role; the main remaining ones are now the Irish-based Ryanair and Britain’s Easyjet. The sole budget airline from the new EU states that survived the cut-throat competition and that operates to this day, including in Ireland and the UK, is the Budapest-based Wizzair (founded in 2003). In all truth, they have been the most important practical and de facto unifiers of the EU at the grassroots level. But even today the bus companies still ply their routes; they continue to show their mettle when snow, fog or volcanic ash paralyze air traffic over Europe.

Technological inventions that allow a Polish-speaker in Ireland to feel as if she were back in Poland, include satellite television and radio, the internet and Skype. In the case of the post-2004 Polish-speaking migrants, satellite television comes in the form of digital platforms. The packages were obviously designed for the Polish market with the majority of Polish-language television channels and state-wide radio stations included in them, in addition to hundreds of other channels and stations broadcasting in a dizzying variety of languages. Polish migrants wishing to follow their favorite soap operas and programs quickly found ways to obtain the services of the Cyfra+ and Polsat Cyfrowy digital platforms in Ireland and Britain, as was obvious from the mushrooming of satellite dishes with the tell-tale logos in both countries. Another platform, n, recently muscled in on the duopoly.

The internet came in handy for Poles migrating to Ireland and Britain from the very beginning. In the early days after their arrival, when they had no PCs or laptops of their own, and thus no private access to the web, they sought out internet cafes in order to remain in touch with their families and friends in Poland. Nowadays they all have computers and permanent personal access to the internet. In this, on average, they are more computer-literate than Poland’s population at large. Through the net they also access Polish-language periodicals and websites, alongside television channels and radio stations, especially from their hometowns, as these are not available on the satellite digital platforms.

The development of the internet created the possibility of channeling phone calls via the web, radically lowering the high cost of such calls (using VoIP, or the Voice over the Internet Protocol). Various internet call cards and internet access telephone numbers had already become obsolete in 2004-5 when the wave of Polish migrants first began to swell. At that time, Skype, founded in 2003, had started widely offering free-of-charge voice and video calls over the net. Today this is the standard way of communicating among Polish-speakers when talking to family and friends living abroad or in different cities. Obviously, the vast majority of the middle-aged and the old in Poland are computer illiterate, meaning that their family and friends from abroad can reach them only via a landline or on a mobile. To this end Skype offers extremely cheap calls of this kind from a PC to a landline telephone or mobile. Mobile and landline operators in Ireland and Britain, alongside a plethora of internet companies, also noticed this niche. The former offer various plans with cheap tariffs for calls to Poland, while the latter support VoIP phone-to-phone calls priced at just the local rate.

The dramatic rise in computer literacy among the post-2004 Polish-speaking migrants, in comparison to residents in Poland, also promoted the migrants to the forefront in the use of social networking websites. Nowadays, the most popular of them is Facebook, launched in 2004. However, this entirely English-language novelty was initially unattractive to Polish-speakers. They first developed a taste for this way of communicating when in 2006 the Polish-language website nasza-klasa.pl (today rebranded as nk.pl), modeled on Classmates.com (founded in 1995), was launched. It appears that for numerous Polish-speakers nk.pl has served as a stepping stone to Facebook; it is likely that the improving knowledge of English on the part of the Polonophone communities in Ireland and Britain was instrumental in this process. Now Polish-speaking migrants seamlessly merge the circles of their Polish, Irish, British and international family and friends, switching among languages and language registers; indeed, di- and polyglossia are now incarnate in cyberspace.

Having established a modicum of economic and social stability in Ireland or Britain, Polish-speakers wanted to have access to Polish-language press, films and books, and to foodstuffs they knew and liked from back in Poland. The latter craving, easily accessed and monetized, spawned the profitable ethnic sector of Polish food products and eateries. Initially, it was a cottage industry, when individuals and small one-van transportation companies were bringing in such foodstuffs in an enthusiastic, amateurish and unstructured manner. Soon wholesalers dealing in these products sprang up, and these products entered the ‘world foods’ aisles in Asda, Tesco and other leading grocery retailers.

Small, individual ethnic Polish shops survive, too, because besides groceries from Poland, they also offer Polish-language periodicals, films on DVD, and, more rarely, books. Furthermore, many such shops double as eateries, informal community and job centers, and contact points through which one can hire Polish workers and craftsmen or get in touch with a transportation company to move between countries or send a package at a rate better than those available at the post office or a regular courier service. Although Polish cafes, restaurants and confectionaries have also made an appearance, they are not so ubiquitous. But the permanent fixture of the Polish ethnic world in the British Isles is the Polish bakery. These bakeries produce ‘real bread,’ the staple food that Polish-speakers most miss in Ireland and Britain, as nothing like it is available there in mainstream shops. (As a result, some Irish men and women claim that it is contributing to raising the standard of bread in Ireland for the ‘aboriginal population’ also.)

Some bookshops in Ireland (though not in Britain)  including Waterstone’s, saw the demand for Polish-language books as a business opportunity and started offering them in Polish-language sections. It seems, though, that these sections have not turned out to be a great success, because the offer has typically been limited and not well thought through, with the exception of stocking bilingual dictionaries.

Into this vacuum the internet came to the succor of Polish-speakers. The biggest Polish internet bookshop, Merlin.pl (established in 1999), began experimenting with selling products abroad in 2005-6, as long as the purchaser was ready to pay online with a credit or debit card. At present the entire range of Polish-language book, periodical and DVD film production can be bought directly from Poland via Merlin.pl or a plethora of other internet bookstores. Furthermore, with the rising popularity of PayPal in the second half of the 2000s, Polonophones living in the British Isles started using the Polish online auction website Allegro.pl (founded in 1999) to the same end. It is also worth mentioning that until the current financial crisis, libraries in Ireland endeavored to offer Polish-language books to their Polish-speaking users, alongside books in other languages of migrants from elsewhere in the EU, mainly in Lithuanian, Russian and Slovak.

The speakers of the three other languages obviously come from Lithuania and Slovakia, and in the case of Russian-speakers, mainly from Estonia and Latvia, with a considerable detachment from Moldova. In the case of Moldovan citizens, many of them, prior to the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007, had gained Romanian citizenship, and with it they have since then legally settled down in Ireland. After a brief hiatus, following the accession of Romania, Bucharest resumed conferring Romanian citizenship on applicants from Moldova. (Entering 2010)

Like Polish-speakers, Lithuanianphones, Slovakophones and Russophones actively constitute three distinct language communities in Ireland. With the use of similar methods they remain in constant touch with the mainstreams of cultural life in these three languages ‘back home.’ The phrase ‘back home’ means Lithuania and Slovakia for Lithuanian- and Slovak-speakers, respectively, but in regard of Russian-speakers it almost invariably refers to the Russian Federation, even though the individual speakers themselves mostly stem from partially Russophone territories outside that state.

While products and foodstuffs from Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland tend to be offered in separate ethnic shops, similar items from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and some other post-Soviet states typically are on sale together in the so-called ‘Eastern European’ shops. When I lived in Dublin between 2007 and 2010, the most successful of all these shops was the Lithuanian supermarket, Lituanica. It did not shy away from offering goods from other new EU member states. In the press corner Polish-, Russian- and Latvian-language magazines, newspapers and DVD films were to be found cheek-by-jowl with Lithuanian-language titles. One could even buy Crimean and Georgian wines in the shop.

This bricolage of languages, products and cultural offers from a variety of new EU and some Eastern European countries, as on display in Dublin and elsewhere in Ireland, is unprecedented anywhere in the native countries of the migrants. Back home they were isolated from speakers of other languages even in the neighboring states by borders and by obstructive visa regimes. In Ireland they can meet and mingle with them on an everyday basis, communicating in English. But to many Polish-speakers it was a revelation that they can easily understand Slovaks (and vice versa), while speaking their respective languages. All of a sudden, spoken Russian does not appear that difficult to understand for a Polish-speaker, unlike the mysterious-looking Cyrillic-based texts in this language. Slovak- and Russophones also make an effort to understand Polish, and when communicating difficulties arise, English serves as a prop. At weekends, many Poles, longing for Central European cuisine and beer, make a beeline to the Czech Inn in Dublin’s Temple Bar area, for dinner with friends and to watch an exciting soccer match. And, indeed, the malleability of the linguistic position is further emphasized, since Slovak staff now work in the Czech Inn, taking the place of people who came from the poorer eastern half of the Czech Republic. 

All these look like a Panslavic dream come true, but this would be looking backward. What fuels the dreams of these migrants is the economic and social attraction of the unprecedented multiculturalism and multilingualism that they can find in Ireland and Britain. There is now a need for wide-ranging social research to see whether migrants marry across the linguistic, ethnic and religious lines that used to separate them in the past; these lines of delineation and separation are in the addition to the borders of their respective states. It would obviously also be of considerable public policy interest for Ireland to assess whether or not these migrants are becoming integrated with the existing Irish population. 


Emigrants, Immigrants, Migrants or New Irish: Dilemmas and Possibilities?

It will not have escaped the reader that in this article I tend to refer to Polish-speakers in Ireland and people who came to this country after 2004 from the new EU member states as ‘migrants.’ In the traditional usage, I should have been talking about them as ‘emigrants’ from the vantage of their home countries, and as ‘immigrants’ from the perspective of Ireland. I opted for the term ‘migrant,’ typically applied to people moving within a single state, on the understanding that in this case the EU functions as a single state. The Common Market freedom of movement of labor, bolstered by the Schengen Agreement that de facto abolished borders as barriers to freedom of movement for individuals, let EU citizens move as freely from one member state to another, as previously they did from region to region in their own native countries.

The barriers of borders, of visa regimes and of separate citizenships that used to separate immigrants in the new country from their home country have disappeared in the EU. Their subsuming into a common European citizenship has facilitated the continuous and unobstructed contact of the Polish-speaking community in Ireland with the mainstream of Polish-language culture in Poland.

Traditionally, the cultural life of emigrant Polish-speaking communities is supported by the local Polish diplomatic institutions. The typical one is the Saturday Polish-medium school. These schools are primarily intended for the children of Polish embassy staff, but are open to the progeny of Polonophone emigrants, if they are lucky enough to live near the diplomatic post. But many live farther afield, and the embassy’s school may not be able to cater for all the interested children. It is then the parents, wishing that their children should become fully fluent in spoken and written Polish, who establish such schools on their own. Sometimes the Catholic Church helps them or even spearheads initiatives of this kind.

Because post-1945 Poland was not only a homogenously Polonophone but also a homogenously Catholic state, Polish clergy followed their faithful to Ireland and Britain. Polish Catholic clergy provide invaluable support and help to many migrants immediately after their arrival in the new country or when they suffer a personal setback. In the long-term perspective, they also provide Polish-language pastoral services for the faithful, including induction into the Polish church for their children born in the new country. (Duszpasterstwo 2011; Polskie parafie 2011)

At present (though the situation tends to change dynamically), four Polish-medium Saturday schools are active in Dublin, and there are 12 more in the following cities and towns across Ireland: Athlone, Ballinasloe, Carlow, Cavan, Clonmel, Cork, Galway, Letterkenny, Limerick, Portlaoise, Sligo and Waterford. The schools have six counterparts in Northern Ireland, in Armagh, Belfast, Derry (Londonderry), Ballymena, Coleraine, and Lurgan. The birth of children to Polish-speaking parents in Ireland is also reflected in the new phenomenon of the Polish-medium kindergarten; there are at least seven in Greater Dublin and one in Limerick. Because of the expense of kindergartens, grandparents often come to Ireland to help their children in rearing their babies, while in some cases au pairs are hired from Poland by Polish parents. (Matwiejczuk 2010; Polskie przedszkola 2011; Polskie szkoły 2011; Polskie szkoły w Irlandii 2011)

The unavailability of hard copies of Polish daily newspapers in Ireland and the fact that the Polish press only occasionally covers the life of the Polish-language community in this country opened a space for a local Polish-medium press. The oldest Polish-language newspaper in Ireland is the weekly, Gazeta Polska (Polish Newspaper), founded in 2005. Interestingly, it is the only one that is sold. The two other weeklies, Nasz Głos (Our Voice, established in 2006) and Polonia Extra (founded in 2010) are distributed free of charge. Besides the weeklies, two free Polish-language monthlies are published, the Kurier Polski (Polish Courier) and the Polski Express (Polish Express), both established in 2006. The latter monthly also includes some articles in English. All three weeklies run websites (www.polskagazeta.ie, www.ng24.ie and www.poloniaextra.com), and the monthly Polski Express (www.polskiexpress.ie). 

It seems, however, that the bulk of Polish-language information is created and exchanged in Ireland via the web, as evidenced, for example, by three information websites (www.gazeta.ie, www.irlandia.ie and www.dublinek.net) and as many as eight social networking websites (www.wyspa.ie, www.wyspiarze.ie, www.myireland.pl, www.mojairlandia.pl, www.zielonairladia.pl, www.nadajemy.ie, www.theireland.ie and www.polonia.org). There is also one Polish social networking website that acts as an interface between the Polish-language community and Ireland’s English-speakers, because its language is English, www.myireland.ie. Polish Catholic clergy in Ireland try to gather their dispersed faithful through the use of religious-cum-community websites (www.polish-chaplaincy.ie, www.dominikanie-dlapolakow.ie, www.jezuici.pl/dublin). Many Polish-speakers in Ireland are young and have problems in meeting appropriate partners, since they work long and unsocial hours or their command of English is shaky. As a result they fall back on Polish-language website dating services (www.randki.ie, www.polishhearts.ie, www.polishdating.ie, www.ipolish.ie). 

As in the case of the electronic versions of the aforementioned press titles, the information and social networking websites also aspire to cater for the Polish-language community in Ireland. On the other hand, the Polish-language press and websites established for the Polish-speaking community in Britain reach Polish-speakers in Northern Ireland as well; these include the information website www.mojawyspa.co.uk, the weekly Cooltura (founded in 2004) or the now weekly Dziennik Polski (Polish Daily), established in 1940 for Polish émigrés in Britain during World War II. Interestingly, in 2011 a new e-weekly was founded in Ireland, the TygodnikPL (WeeklyPL, www.tygodnikpl.net), which aspires, with its high quality journalism, to find readers in Britain and Germany also.

At least one Polish-language radio program is broadcast from Dublin, while the Internetowa Telewizja Polonia (Internet Television Polonia, www.itve.pl) is also based in the Irish capital. But having said all that, it appears that the Polish-language press and websites (let alone the television or radio programs produced locally in Ireland) have no hope of successfully competing head-on with their mainstream counterparts from Poland. The only plausible niche open to Ireland’s Polonophone media is in serving the specific local interests of the Polish-language community in Ireland, which are not covered by the mainstream media based in Poland.

This should not come as a surprise because, as I argue above, the barriers to the participation of Ireland’s Polish-speakers in the mainstream of Polish-language culture, as produced and developed in Poland, today are minimal. Indicative of this is the fact that many Poles who moved to Ireland prior to graduation from their universities in Poland, decide to continue their university studies on a part-time basis. To this end once or twice a month they fly to their Polish universities to attend classes over a weekend. Universities in Poland are well aware of such students and take good care of them, because unlike day students these part-time counterparts pay tuition. To capitalize on these students, two Polish tertiary-education institutions have opened branches in Dublin, namely the Społeczna Szkoła Wyższa Przedsiębiorczości i Zarządzania (Private Higher Education School of Entrepreneurship and Management, which however, uses the ‘Academy of Management,’ as its official name in English) in Łódź (http://www.pao.pl/pao-ir/) and the Wyższa Szkoła Rozwoju Lokalnego (Higher Education School of Local Development) in Żyrardów   (http://wsrl.pl/index.php?page=adad).

Bearing in mind that neither in Ireland nor in Britain has a single fully-fledged Polish-medium school been established so far, I deduce that parents clearly want their children to finish their education in mainstream English-medium schools in Ireland or Britain. Perhaps they are right to  believe that only such schools will offer their children the best educational chances in their new countries. Many worry that it means their children will end up speaking ‘improper Polish’ and will write this language ‘as illiterates.’ This shows that for various reasons the maintenance of Polish in their families is important for most Polonophone parents. I also observe that in families where only one spouse is a Polish-speaker, the Anglophone spouse usually supports the other’s wish that their children become fluent in Polish, too. Both understand that in an integrated Europe and in the globalizing world, native or near-native command of two languages will put their children at an advantage when it comes to work and career prospects.

The inclusion through virtual means of the Polish-speech communities in Ireland and Britain in the mainstream of Polish-language culture will obviously facilitate the achievement of this goal. Yet only the most conscientious parents will be able to groom their children’s literacy in Polish to the high level that is the standard in Poland. I believe, however, that parents will find an easy solution to this dilemma. Nowadays their counterparts from Poland send their offspring for a year or two to Britain or the United States so that they can attend secondary school there in order to polish their English. Some go abroad later on to study, for an exchange year, at an Anglophone university or even to graduate with a degree from one. In an integrated Europe I can easily imagine a movement in the opposite direction, with Polish-speaking parents sending their daughters and sons to schools and universities in Poland. 

The question remains, however, of what the Irish people and the Irish administration will make out of the Polish-language community that appeared in their midst after 2004. It is now too late to reverse the tide, even if Ireland seems to have waded into this full-blown multiculturalism in a fit of absentmindedness. Common EU citizenship guarantees for Ireland’s Polish-speakers practically the same social, economic and political privileges and responsibilities as Irish citizenship does for the Irish. But it may be not enough for the new generation of Polish-speakers already born on Irish soil. Ireland will be first and foremost their country and to participate in its life fully they will need Irish citizenship in order not to feel excluded in any way. Whatever answer is formulated to address this increasingly burning issue, it should be well thought through, as it will have long-term ramifications. Withholding Irish citizenship from Ireland’s Polish-speakers for any reason may hinder their integration, and in the context of the current economic crisis may make them into second-class residents or second-class EU citizens. Such a policy, in all probability, would lead to the rise of ethnic ghettoes. 
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^1	  As always, I am grateful to Michael O Gorman for his insightful advice and invaluable help with editing. I also thank Przemysław Kolasiński for his factual comments and information on Polish-language cultural and educational life in Ireland. Obviously, I am responsible for any remaining infelicities.
^2	  When referring to Belarus and its language in Soviet times or earlier, I use Byelorussia and Byelorussian, respectively, in reflection of the Russian and Western usage that tacitly held this language to be a dialect of Russian; this was especially visible in the direct English translation of the name of this language, often encountered before 1991, that yielded the unequivocal term ‘White Russian.’ After gaining independence, in line with its own wishes, Byelorussia became Belarus, and its language, Belarusian.
^3	  Ironically but tellingly, though the difference between Poles, on the one hand, and Belarusians and Ukrainians, on the other, was couched in linguistic terms, in practice, when living side by side in the same or in neighboring villages, they spoke the identical Slavic dialect. Hence, in reality religion was employed as the marker to decide a person’s nationality, a bit ironic in the context of the ideologically atheistic Soviet Union. In the scheme of things, a Catholic Slavophone was invariably a Pole ‘speaking Polish,’ while an Orthodox or Greek Catholic Slavophone could be a Byelorussian or a Ukrainian ‘speaking Byelorussian or Ukrainian,’ respectively. Who was a Byelorussian or a Ukrainian was decided with the yardstick of the post-1569 southern frontier of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which, following World War I, reemerged as the border between Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Ukraine, continuing westward as the divide between the ethnically Byelorussian and Ukrainian administrative regions inside interwar Poland. After 1945, interwar Poland’s Byelorussian and Ukrainian areas were attached to Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Ukraine, respectively. (Eberhardt 1998: 33)
^4	  Russian as a Slavic language is closer to Polish than, for instance, is the Baltic language of Lithuanian. Furthermore, the attraction of Russian as the language of power, of intellectual and economic achievement, and of continent-wide communication puts it in a privileged position vis-à-vis, for instance, the Slavic languages of Belarusian and Ukrainian.
^5	  Interestingly, from the linguistic vantage many of the Polish-Americans are Gorals (or Górale in Polish) who speak the Goralian (Podhalanian) language/dialect, which is quite distinct from standard Polish, and in many respects is closer to Slovak. (Kucharzyk 2011; Schneider 2006: 94)
^6	  In contrast with this reality, the stereotypical image of the Polish Jew in Polish literature and film is almost invariably connected to an imperfect command of the Polish language, resulting in a ‘Jewish Polish.’ (cf Brzezina 1986) Ironically, some of the best (and best loved) Polish poets of the 20th century were Jews, for instance, Jan Brzechwa, Bolesław Leśmian, or Julian Tuwim.
^7	  In line with the Good Friday Agreement (1998), Dublin and London are committed to the social, cultural and (to a degree) economic integration of the entire island of Ireland, though without compromising the political inclusion of Northern Ireland within the borders of the United Kingdom. The freedom of movement between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland being unrestricted, the frontiers open and not policed, in the text I attempt to cover the whole island. When the necessity arises to distinguish between the political entities extant in Ireland, I speak of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
^8	  There is a degree of confusion in the use of the adjectives Bosniak and Bosnian. The former is preferred when referring to Bosnia’s Muslims and their language, while the latter is used to refer to the entire population of Bosnia, irrespective of their national or religious allegiance. In this scheme of things there is no ‘Bosnian language’, but rather ‘Bosnian languages’, meaning the three official and national languages of Bosnia, namely, Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian.
^9	  In 2011, the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), one of Northern Ireland’s Protestant parties, proudly advertized a Catholic Pole as a member. But one wonders whether it is a harbinger of a new beginning of transcending the confesionally delineated divisions, or just a PR stunt. (Moriarty 2011)
^10	  ‘Slavia’ is a neologism popular among Slavicists for denoting the totality of all Slavs and Slavic-speakers, usually those resident in their homelands.
